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"The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court."
-Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
"While the parental rights of even an imprisoned father must not be
disregarded, the best interests of the child must be kept paramount."
-Matter of Sasha, 675 N.Y.S.2d 605, 606 (App. Div. 1998).
ABSTRACT: This Note seeks to understand how people in prison may lose
their parental rights as a result of their incarceration, despite long-established
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine protecting family integrity and the ability to
care for one's children. Focusing on New York State as a case study, I argue
that parents in prison are governed by an alternative, social-welfare family law
regime in which aggressive state interference is normalized and constitutional
protections of liberty and privacy do not fully apply. I suggest that by exposing
this approach as harmful to children, advocates for incarcerated parents can
take a step towards bridging the two family law paradigms and bringing greater
recognition to the rights of incarcerated parents and their families.
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INTRODUCTION
Today, it is not uncommon for parents in prison-particularly those who
lack economic resources and supportive family networks-to lose their parental
rights while they are incarcerated.I The Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA), a federal law passed in 1997, creates incentives to move children out
of foster care and into adoption placements as quickly as possible. Specifically,
AFSA requires states to file petitions to terminate parental rights when children
have been in foster care for fifteen of the past twenty-two months.2 Parents in
prison are likely to trigger this filing deadline, as the typical sentence for an
incarcerated parent is between 80 and 100 months. 3 At the same time, practical
and legal obstacles make it difficult for parents in prison to maintain contact
1. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. See also ARLENE F. LEE ET AL., CHILD WELFARE
LEAGUE OF AMERICA, THE IMPACT OF THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT ON CHILDREN OF
INCARCERATED PARENTS 7-8 (2005), available
at www.fcnetwork.org/Resourcc%20Center/coppubimpact.pdf (finding a significant overall increase in
the number of termination cases involving incarcerated parents since 1997).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-89, §103, Ill Stat. 2118-20 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §675(5)).
3. STEVE CHRISTIAN, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED
PARENTS PAGE (2009), available at www.ncsl.org/documents/cyf/childrenofincarceratedparents.pdf See
also Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 321, 348-51
(2005) (noting that average prison sentences are longer than the twenty-two-months).
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with and plan for the future of their children, actions that become crucial if a
parent is to defend herself against accusations of unfitness.4
The severity of this problem becomes apparent in light of the rise in
incarceration that has taken place over the past few decades. The United States
incarcerates more people than any other country in the world, with 2.3 million
people currently in the nation's prisons or jails-a 500% increase over the past
thirty years.5 As the number of adults in prison increases, so does the number
of children who are left behind:6 Of the 74 million children in the United States
in mid-2007, one study has estimated that 1.7 million, or 2.3%, had an
incarcerated parent,7 with roughly half of these children under ten years old.8 In
2007, most people incarcerated in the United States reported having minor
children: 63% of federal inmates and 52% of state inmates.9 These statistics are
even starker in communities of color, where 1 out of 15 black children reported
having a parent in prison, compared to I out of every 111 white children. 10
While this Note examines the rights of incarcerated parents across gender lines,
incarcerated women face particular challenges because they are more likely to
be primary caretakers and thus be compelled to put their children into foster
11
care.
Scholars and practitioners have argued that ASFA and its implementation
through state law violate the constitutional right to family integrity and
undermine the due process protections that should safeguard the rights of
parents.12 Yet in the published termination of parental rights (TPR) decisions
4. See infra pp. 29-3 1.
5. WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2008 (2008) ("State
and federal prisons and local jails had custody or physical guardianship over 2,304,115 inmates.").
6. Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child's Constitutional Right to the Family
Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 81 (2011) (citing LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M.
MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN
PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1-2 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf.).
7. GLAZE & MARUSCHACK, supra note 6, at 1-2.
8. SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR
CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991-2007, at 6 (2009), available at
http://www.sentencingprojcct.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_ incarceratedparents.pdf (providing
comprehensive demographic data on incarcerated parents and their children).
9. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 6, at 1.
10. SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 8, at 1-2. It should also be noted that more than 70% of children
with a parent behind bars are children of color. Id.
I1. JOCELYN M. POLLACK, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF PARENTING PROGRAMS IN WOMEN'S PRISONS
IN THE U.S., in WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLICY ISSUES AND PRACTICE
STRATEGIES 19-1, 19-2 (2006) ("Most incarcerated mothers have minor children and were, before their
incarceration, the primary caretakers of their children."); see also SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 8, at 7
("While the vast majority of children of male prisoners are living with their mothers, only about a third
(37%) of the children of incarcerated women are living with their fathers. Most of these children are
living with grandparents or other relatives, while one out of every nine (10.9%) women in prison has a
child living in foster care.").
12. Emily K. Nicholson, Racing Against the ASFA Clock: How Incarcerated Parents Lose More
than Freedom, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 83, 94 (2006) (arguing that under Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982), incarcerated parents and their children have a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination
of parental rights); Christina White, Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black Family: The Adoption
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that involve incarcerated parents, courts rarely invoke these constitutional
rights. In fact, far from being perceived as meaningful and constitutionally
protected, relationships between incarcerated parents and their children are
diminished in status, with parents' and children's interests placed in opposition
before parental unfitness has been determined. "While the parental rights of
even an imprisoned father must not be disregarded," writes one Family Court in
New York State, "the best interests of the child must be kept paramount."13
This approach to families falls in sharp contrast to Supreme Court doctrine that
emphasizes the fundamental nature of the parent-child relationship and the
interest that parents and children share in preserving family integrity. How is it
that the Supreme Court recently held that a state had infringed upon parental
rights by allowing courts to grant visitation privileges to a child's
grandparents,14 while incarcerated parents of children in foster care may lose
their parental rights, permanently and entirely, without so much as a nod to
family integrity doctrine?
Drawing from the work of a number of theorists, I argue that the disparities
between the treatment of incarcerated and free parents can be explained
through an understanding of family law not as a single entity, but as bifurcated
along lines of class, race, gender, and criminality, with economically self-
sufficient families receiving different treatment from families perceived as
economically dependent or deviant. Jill Hasday has argued that poor families
that lack a male bread-winner have historically been governed by a "social
welfare paradigm of family law," in which aggressive state intervention is not
seen as violating the constitutional rights of the parents involved.' 5 Invoking
the work of Dorothy E. Roberts,' 6 Deseriee A. Kennedy, 7 and others, I expand
Hasday's concept to argue that this aggressive state intervention is triggered not
only by poverty and non-normative gender arrangements, but by racial
difference and criminality as well. Because incarcerated parents fall at the
intersection of these categories-because they have been convicted of crimes,
and Safe Families Act, I Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 303, 327-31 (2006) (arguing that ASFA infringes on
the constitutional right to family integrity); Amy Wilkinson-Hagen, The Adoption and Safe Families Act
of 1997: A Collision of Parens Patriae and Parents' Constitutional Rights, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 137, 148-64 (2004) (arguing that ASFA violates Fourteenth Amendment substantive and
procedural due process in a variety of different ways); see generally DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED
BONDS (2002) (arguing that the current child welfare regime is destructive to black families and
communities). For a pre-ASFA but still highly relevant assessment of how state child welfare law
violates the constitutionally protected procedural due process rights of incarcerated parents, see Philip
M. Genty, Procedural Due Process Rights of Incarcerated Parents in Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings: A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757, 764-65 (1992).
13. In re Sasha, 675 N.Y.S.2d 605, 606 (App. Div. 1998).
14. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-71 (2000).
15. Jill Hasday, Parenthood Divided, 90 GEO. L.J. 299,301-03 (2002).
16. ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 8.
17. Deseriee A. Kennedy, Children, Parents, & The State: The Construction of a New Family
Ideology, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 78, 96 (2011).
178 [Vol. 24:1
Family Integrity and Incarcerated Parents
are disproportionately poor people of color, 8 and are not "normal" parents in
that they are unable to physically care for their children-the social welfare
paradigm of family law applies to them with particular force. Aggressive
intervention is seen as necessary for the protection of their children, and
constitutional principles of family integrity and parental rights do not fully
apply.
I begin this Note with an exploration of the well-established constitutional
right to family integrity. In Part II, I describe the alternative version of family
law that applies to the incarcerated parents of children in foster care. I explore
the mechanics of how an incarcerated parent's rights can be terminated,
focusing on AFSA and its application through state law. I show that the law
fails to recognize incarcerated parents as deserving of the same protections as
non-incarcerated parents, and that the social welfare framework helps us to
understand why this is the case.
Finally, in Part III, I explore how we might shift existing legal regimes so
that the integrity of all families-even those divided by incarceration-is
recognized and valued. Using New York State' 9 as a case study, I argue that
family integrity arguments will become cognizable to courts only when the
laws that infringe on the rights of incarcerated parents are exposed as
undermining the compelling state interest in protecting children. I suggest that
current law is harmful to the children of incarcerated parents for three reasons:
first, because it leads to the erroneous termination of parental rights in some
cases, to the detriment of all involved; secondly, because the termination of
parental rights does not by any means ensure that a child will subsequently be
adopted into a stable home; and finally, because the law may be based on an
inaccurate understanding of what children's best interests actually are.
I: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FAMILIAL INTEGRITY
A. Origins and Scope
Parental rights originally derived from the patriarchal idea, based in
common law, that a man's role as head of his household was to maintain
authority over his wife and children. 20 Over time, this doctrine has been
18. SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (Two thirds of the incarccrated parent population is non-
white).
19. I chose New York State as a case study because it is a site of recent litigation-based and
legislative efforts at reform. In 2010 it passed the Adoption and Safe Families Expanded Discretion Act,
(A.5462-A/S.2233-A) (2010), pioneering legislation offering greater protections to incarcerated parents,
while its courts recently invoked the constitutional doctrine of family integrity to protect the interests of
another group of vulnerable parents: survivors of domestic violence.
20. Hasday, supra note 15, at 309. See also PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE
CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 8 (1997) ("Feminist scholars have had special cause to resist
family rights doctrine, for it has its origins in a male-centered ideology that asserts, vis-A-vis the state,
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reconstituted as a broader set of liberty interests that find their authority in the
Fourteenth Amendment's provision that no state shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." On the broadest level,
these liberty interests encompass an individual's right to make decisions
concerning family formation, including the right to marry,21 the right to
procreate,22 and the right to terminate a pregnancy.23 Once a family has
formed, parents have an interest in the "care, custody, and control"24 of their
children and in not being forcibly separated from them, sometimes referred to
as an interest in "familial association" 25 or "family integrity." 26
The right to the "care and custody of one's children" extends to many
forms of decision-making that parents exercise over their children's lives. In
Meyer v. Nebraska, one of the first cases to constitutionalize the common-law
rights of parents, the Court considered a ban on foreign language instruction in
public schools. 27 It overturned the conviction of a teacher who was prosecuted
for teaching German to a ten-year-old student, finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects "the power of parents to control the education of their
own." 28 A few years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court invalidated
an Oregon law that required parents to send their children to public school,
finding that "the child is not a mere creature of the state" and that parents "have
the right, coupled with the high duty" to control their children's upbringing.29
Most recently, in 2000 the Court held in Troxel v. Granville that until a parent
has been adjudicated as unfit, courts may not grant visitation privileges to non-
custodial third parties-even grandparents-without at least some degree of
deference to the parent's wishes. 30
In addition to the right to care, custody, and control, courts have
recognized a broader right to family integrity. "We have little doubt that the
Due Process Clause would be offended," the Supreme Court held in Quilloin v.
Walcott, "'if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of
the primacy of the claims of malc heads of houscholds to act as they please with respect to wives and
children, whom the law first conceptualized as men's property.").
21. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. Skinner v. State of OkI. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
24. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
25. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116-17 (1996) ("Choices about marriage, family life, and the
upbringing of children are ... sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted
usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.").
26. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted) (holding, in a case considering
the rights of unwed fathers, that "[t]he integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .....
27. Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
28. Id.at401.
29. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
30. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
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unfitness.'"31 This interest is held by both parents and their children.32 While
the "care and custody of one's children" cases often involved the rights of
privileged parents to control relatively minor details of their children's lives,
the right to family integrity has been developed in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.13 and
Santosky v. Kramer34-- cases which involved attempts by the state to
permanently terminate the rights of poor or otherwise marginalized parents.
Courts have described the termination of parental rights as "the nadir in
destruction of the family integrity interest,"35 one of the most severe actions
that a state can take vis-A-vis an individual. In ML.B., the Supreme Court
described termination of parental rights as a form of "branding." 36 Lower
courts have used similarly powerful language, characterizing TPR as a "civil
death penalty." 37
Taking a broader historical perspective, Peggy Cooper Davis argues that
the right to family integrity itself developed in reaction to the destruction of
African American families during slavery. Because the utter disrespect for
family bonds was a defining element of slavery in the United States, 39 the right
to family became central to the antislavery movement, with stories of violence
inflicted on families motivating the development of the Reconstruction
Amendments. 40 Thus, from its origins, the right to family integrity emerged as
relevant and necessary precisely because the destruction of the family was seen
as a powerful vehicle of subjugation and dehumanization that could be inflicted
on minority groups. To combat this threat, parental and familial rights have
31. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
32. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The interest in not being
forcibly separated by the state is shared by parents and children.").
33. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119 (1996).
34. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
35. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at il6.
36. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 119, 126 ("Does the Fourteenth Amendment require Mississippi to accord
M.L.B. access to an appeal ... before she is forever branded unfit for affiliation with her children? ....
[M.L.B.] is endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds, and to resist the
brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudication. Like a defendant resisting criminal conviction,
she seeks to be spared from the State's devastatingly adverse action.").
37. J.L.N. v. Nevada, 118 Nev. 621 (2002); see also In re Smith, 601 E.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio App. 6
Dist. 1991) (describing permanent termination of parental rights as the "family law equivalent of the
death penalty in a criminal case").
38. DAVIS, supra note 20, at 9.
39. Id. ("Slavery . . . required that men, women, and children be bound more surely by ties of
ownership than by tics of kinship. Slave Power supported itself by annulment of marital, parental, and
paternal rights.").
40. Id. at 10 ("Drafters and advocates of the Fourteenth Amendment had vivid impressions of what
it meant to be denied family rights . . . . The people who struggled for abolition and reconstruction
regarded denial of family liberty as a vice of slavery that inverted concepts of human dignity,
citizenship, and natural law. And they regarded the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument to re-
enshrine family rights as inalienable aspects of national citizenship and natural law."); id. at 105
("Indignation against these violations of the parental bond was a central rallying cry of the antislavery
movement."); id. at 112 ("The Reconstruction Congress directly addressed the abolitionists' insistence
that former slaves, and all other citizens, be secure in the parental relation.").
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evolved along both procedural and substantive lines: first, parents must be
given adequate procedural due process protections before their families are
intruded upon; secondly, the denial of familial protections only becomes
tenable when a compelling state interest-such as protecting children-requires
it.
B. Procedural and Substantive Protections
The fundamental liberty interests in "family integrity" and "care and
custody of one's children" give rise to both procedural and substantive due
process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.41 These familial rights
are considered "fundamental," with the result that any law that interferes with
42them must generally withstand strict scrutiny. However, because the state has
a long-recognized, compelling interest in the protection of children, the right to
parental control and custody has always been subject to limitations. 43 In certain
situations-namely, when parents have abused or neglected their children-the
state may step in and order the parents to change their behavior; remove the
children from their homes; and, in extreme cases, permanently terminate
parental rights.
While the protection of children is undeniably a compelling interest, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that parental rights do not disappear when
parents have acted badly, are estranged from their children, or have lost
custody: "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child ... does not evaporate simply because
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child
to the State." 44 Individuals facing termination of their parental rights are thus
entitled to particularly robust due process protections:
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital
interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.
If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental
rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do
41. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 235 (characterizing the "rights of family integrity" and "parental
authority" as fundamental liberty interests, and finding that proceedings which implicate said interests
must be analyzed from both procedural and substantive due process standpoints).
42. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 59.
43. Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997)
("This liberty interest in familial integrity is limited by the compelling governmental interest in the
protection of children-particularly where the children need to be protected from their own parents.");
see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("[A] State is not without constitutional control over
parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized."); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) ("[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the
public interest . . .and . . .the rights of parenthood arc [not] beyond limitation . . . The state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare").
44. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 62.
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those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the
State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the
parents with fundamentally fair procedures. 45
The Supreme Court has required a standard of "clear and convincing
evidence" in termination of parental rights proceedings46 and has prohibited
courts from barring a TPR appeal based on lack of financial resources.47 In
addition, the Court has mandated that all TPR decisions be based on
"individual determinations" of parental fitness, rather than on "presumptions"
based on a particular quality or status.48
Because termination of parental rights is not a criminal matter, states are
not constitutionally required to provide any additional due process protections
to parents beyond what the Supreme Court has mandated. Specifically, the
Court has held that states are not required to provide a parent facing TPR with
an attorney, and that the necessity of counsel can instead be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. 49 In addition, parents are not necessarily guaranteed the
right to attend a TPR hearing in person, a factor that becomes particularly
relevant in the context of incarcerated parents.50
The fundamental liberty interest in family integrity would appear to be a
useful framework in advocating for people in prison facing the termination of
their parental rights; yet this doctrine is almost never invoked by courts that
adjudicate these claims. Battles are instead fought over the technicalities of the
state statutes governing the TPR process: for example, what it means for an
incarcerated parent to "maintain contact" with and "plan for the future" of her
child; the efforts required by an agency to "strengthen the relationship"
between an incarcerated parent and her child; and access to counsel. While any
of these issues could be framed in terms of rights to family integrity, courts do
45. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54.
46. Id at 747-48.
47. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119-22 (1996).
48. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972) ("Procedure by presumption is always cheaper
and easier than individualized determination. But . . . the State cannot, consistently with due process
requirements, merely presume that unmarried fathers in general and petitioner in particular are
unsuitable and neglectful parents. Parental unfitness must be established on the basis of individualized
proof.").
49. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Scrvs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that the Due Process Clause does
not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination
proceeding). For an analysis of Lassiter, see DAVIS, supra note 20, at 141 ("The Court seemed to forget
that in an adversary system, complexity in litigation is, more often than not, the product of the very
things its decision precluded: the presence of trained and assertive advocates who will investigate and
articulate competing claims.").
50. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Quenette, 341 N.W.2d 619 (N.D. 1983); In re Darrow, 649 P.2d
858 (Wash. 1982). Even states that give parents the right to appear often do nothing to ensure their
presence, and courts may draw inferences against parents for their failure to appear. See, e.g., In re
Murphy, 414 S.E.2d 396, 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) ("We hold that an incarcerated parent does not have
an absolute right to be transported to a termination of parental rights hearing in order that he may be
present under either statutory or constitutional law.").
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not mention broad constitutional principles. In the section that follows, I argue
that this can be explained by the fact that parents in prison fall into an
alternative, social welfare family law regime, in which parental rights are in
tension with a social-welfare-based understanding of the relationship between
families and state.
II. A SECOND FAMILY LAW REGIME-HOW THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF PEOPLE
IN PRISON ARE TERMINATED BY THE STATE.
A. Theoretical Framework: Family Law Bifurcation
Family integrity language and doctrine is generally absent from cases
involving the rights of parents in prison because parental rights do not fully
apply to this population-instead, parents in prison are governed by an
alternate paradigm of family law, in which aggressive state intervention into
families, and the overriding of parental rights, is seen as both normal and
necessary. In making this argument, I rely on the work of a number of theorists
who share the general assertion that family law, both historically and today, has
extended its protection and support only to those families that are perceived by
the dominant culture to be self-sufficient or that conform to some kind of
normative ideal.
Jill Hasday provides a comprehensive historical analysis of the dual-
evolution of parental privacy doctrine on the one hand, and intervention into
economically non-self-sufficient families on the other.5' She shows that
common-law deference to parental authority did not traditionally extend to
families that lacked a bread-winning husband and father figure. These families
were seen as inherently dysfunctional and in need of state authority to fill the
gap left by an absent or economically deficient man. Thus, in the late 19th
century, societies for the prevention of child cruelty collaborated with courts to
remove children from homes where the father was unable to financially support
his wife and children, even as these same courts protected and reinforced the
rights of parents in two-parent, economically stable households. 52
Hasday notes that even today, state intervention is not necessarily triggered
by emergency situations of abuse and neglect; rather, states continue to
intervene based on poverty, for example, by making economic aid contingent
upon intrusive home visits and monitoring by social workers. 53 Marsha
51. Hasday, supra note 15, at 300 ("The American law of parent and child is conventionally
understood to be extremely deferential to parental prerogatives and highly reluctant to intervene."). See,
e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
52. Hasday, supra note 15, at 333.
53. Id. at 357-60.
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Garrison has made a similar argument about family law bifurcation in the
contemporary child welfare context, theorizing a "dual family law-one for the
rich and one for the poor." 54 The failure of today's foster care system to
adequately acknowledge and respect the relationships between poor parents and
their children, she writes, is "deeply rooted in the poor law traditions of the
child welfare system."5 5 Family law today is bifurcated along racial lines as
well as those of class. Scholars have argued that, like the early child cruelty
prevention societies, current child welfare practices are both racially
discriminatory and equate poverty with neglect.56 Shani King describes the
disparate racial impact of current child welfare policies on children of color, as
well as the intentional discrimination embedded in the historical roots of many
of these laws. 5
Hasday asserts that many people in the United States today would not
subscribe to the assumptions and prejudices that underlie the bifurcated family
law regime.58 She argues that interventionist state practices are difficult to
challenge primarily because the law that affects poor families is categorized as
welfare rather than family law, disguising the implications that it has for family
privacy and parental rights.59 Yet the strongest argument in favor of a
bifurcated regime-that the compelling state interest in protecting children
justifies aggressive intervention into certain families, regardless of whether this
disparately affects poor communities and communities of color-continues to
find powerful support in the law. 60
In her book Shattered Bonds, Dorothy E. Roberts argues that the child
welfare policy "pendulum" has swung away from the goal of family
reunification and towards the goal of removing children from troubled homes.
Roberts documents the ways in which "[f]amily preservation and child safety
are treated as two opposing ends of the spectrum of child welfare concerns,"
54. Masha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423,432 (1983).
55. Id.at436-37.
56. ROBERTS, supra note 12, at vi ("Black children make up nearly half of the foster care
population, although they constitute less than one-fifth of the nation's children . . .. Once removed from
their homes, Black children . . . arc less likely to be either returned home or adopted than other
children.").
57. Shani King, The Family Law Canon ina (Post?) Racial Era, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 575 (2011).
58. Hasday, supra note 15, at 303-04 ("The divide in the law's treatment of parenthood is generally
taken to be ... commonsensical and so familiar .. . even though many of the reasons historically offered
to create and maintain the bifurcation would not persuade substantial numbers of contemporary
Americans.").
59. Id. at 303 ("[T]he divide in the regulation of parenthood has avoided critical attention because
family law is still conventionally defined to include only those legal practices and presumptions applied
to families considered financially self-sufficient ... .The bodies of law that operate to constrain or deny
household autonomy are typically understood as falling solely within the jurisdiction of welfare or
poverty law, even though they regulate the rights, responsibilities, and relationships of family members
and thus importantly function as forms of family law as well.").
60. ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 103 ("The past five years have witnessed the passage of critical
legislation that weakens family bonds . . . . In its place, a new orientation emphasizes 'freeing' children
in foster care for adoption by speeding up termination of parental rights.").
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with the parental rights of black parents increasingly seen as a barrier to
adoption by a stable, functional-and often white, middle or upper class-
family. Incarcerated parents face a particularly acute version of what Roberts
and others have identified: a societal assumption that the rights of parents
necessarily conflict with, and are detrimental to, the best interests of their
children.
In the paragraphs above, I suggest that laws that push states to terminate
parental rights in order to more quickly "free" foster children for adoption
disproportionately affect poor families of color in general and incarcerated
parents in particular, and are an expression of a bifurcated family law regime in
which the familial rights of these populations are devalued. In what follows, I
provide a more specific description and analysis of how this devaluation
occurs. First, I describe how the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA)
pushes states to initiate TPR petitions against incarcerated parents; second, I
outline some of the structural and legal barriers that interfere with the ability of
family courts to make fair and individualized determinations of parental fitness,
once ASFA has set a TPR petition into motion.
B. The Adoption and Safe Families Act: Initiating the TPR Petition
The Adoption and Safe Families Act 62 has made it dramatically easier for
states to terminate the rights of parents with children in foster care. Referred to
as "the most sweeping changes to the nation's adoption and foster-care system
in nearly two decades," 63 ASFA was designed to move children from the foster
care system into permanent homes and to prioritize children's health and safety
over family reunification.6
ASFA requires that states file a petition to terminate parental rights if a
child has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months;
if the child has been determined by a court to be abandoned; or if the parent has
been convicted of particular crimes against a child for whom the parent was
65
legally responsible. There are some exceptions, most significantly if the child
61. Id. at 104.
62. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
63. Katharine Q. Scelyc, Clinton to Approve Sweeping Shift in Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1997, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/1l/17/us/clinton-to-approve-sweeping-shift-in-
adoption.html.
64. Id. ("Senator John H. Chafee . . . a leading sponsor of the legislation, said . . . before the
measure passed . . . 'We will not continue the current system of always putting the needs and rights of
the biological parents first.' Although that is a worthy goal, he said, 'it's time we recognize that some
families simply cannot and should not be kept together."'); see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2006)
("[T]he child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern.").
65. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006) ("[I]n the case of a child who has been in foster care under the
responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months, or, if a court of competent jurisdiction
has determined a child to be an abandoned infant . . . or has made a determination that the parent has
committed murder of another child of the parent, committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of
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is placed with a relative or if the state determines that it is in the child's best
interest not to file for termination of parental rights.66 ASFA also allows states
to bypass the duty to make a "reasonable effort" to reunite children with their
biological parents in certain situations. 67 Finally, ASFA provides bonuses to
states that increase their adoption rates, particularly the adoption of older and
disabled children, at rates of between $4,000 and $8,000 per child.68
It is important to note that the initiation of a TPR petition does not
necessarily mean that a parent's rights will in fact be terminated. A parent
retains her constitutional rights, and the state must support its allegations with
clear and convincing evidence.69 A TPR hearing, however, is not a neutral
process to check the status of a child's placement; it is a traumatic, adversarial
proceeding in which the child protective services attempts "to convince the
court that terminating .. .parental rights and placing [the] child up for adoption
is the best solution for [the] child." 70 The Supreme Court in Santosky described
the fact-finding stage of a hearing to terminate parental rights as a process that
"pits the State directly against the parents. "When the State initiates a
parental rights termination proceeding," the Court elaborated, "it seeks not
merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it."72 It is also a
hearing in which the State often has the upper hand, as "[t]he State's ability to
assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents' ability to mount a
defense." 73 It follows that ASFA's 15/22 months provision, particularly
combined with other provisions that incentivize states to move children out of
foster care as quickly as possible, results not merely in more TPR petitions
being initiated, but in more parents losing their rights.
the parent, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a
voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to the
child or to another child of the parent, the State shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the
child's parents . . . and, concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for an
adoption").
66. Id. (stating that the State shall file a petition to terminate parental rights unless "[A]t the option
of the State, the child is being cared for by a rclative; a State agency has documented in the case plan
(which shall be available for court review) a compelling reason for determining that filing such a
petition would not be in the best interests of the child; or the State has not provided to the family of the
child, consistent with the time period in the State case plan, such services as the State deems necessary
for the safe return of the child to the child's home .... ).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2006) (stating that states do not have to make a reasonable effort at
reunification if a parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as defined by state law, if
the parent has committed certain violent crimes against another of his or her children, or if the parent has
previously had his or her rights terminated).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 673(d)(1) (2006).
69. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 746 (1982).
70. A JAILHOUSE LAWYER'S MANUAL, CHAP. 33 at D (Columbia Human Rights Law Review ed.,
8th ed. 2009), available at www3.law.columbia.cdu/hrlr/JLM/Chapter 33.pdf. (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 384-b(3)(b) (McKinney 203 & Supp. 2008)).
71. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 763.
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It is difficult to measure the exact relationship between incarceration and
termination of parental rights because incarceration can factor into a TPR
determination in a variety of ways, some of which may not be immediately
discernible from the record.74 In addition, TPR determinations are made at the
state level, where most trial court and some intermediate appellate cases are
unreported. Nonetheless, scholars and practitioners have argued that ASFA
has caused an increase in the number of incarcerated parents who lose their
parental rights. Incarcerated parents are likely to fall into the category of
parents whose children have been in foster care for fifteen out of the past
twenty-two months and thus trigger the ASFA filing deadline, as the typical
sentence for an incarcerated parent is between eighty and one hundred
77
months. A 2005 study by the Child Welfare League of America reports a
significant increase in the number of termination cases involving incarcerated
parents that were filed between 1997 and 2002, indicating a strong correlation
between incarceration and termination of parental rights under ASFA. 78
Another study estimates a 250% increase in cases terminating parental rights
due to parental incarceration since the enactment of ASFA.79 Finally, some
scholars have suggested that AFSA has reverberations beyond the mandates of
the federal law itself, both encouraging states to amend their child welfare law
74. See infra pp. 22-24. In some states, incarceration itself can be a statutory ground for termination
of parental rights; in others, it may inform the court's determination of whether a parent has been
neglectful. In still other cases, incarceration may factor into the dispositional phase of the hearing, in
which the court determines whether TPR would further the best interests of the child. See also Kennedy,
supra note 17, at 101 ("It is difficult to assess the impact of incarceration on parental termination
proceedings . , ").
75. LEE, supra note 1, at 7.
76. See, e.g., id. at 7-8; Antoinette Greenaway, Note, When Neutral Policies Aren 't So Neutral:
Increasing Incarceration Rates and the Effect of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 on the
Parental Rights of African American Women, 17 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 247, 256-57 (2002-04); Kennedy,
supra note 17, at 105 ("While the ASFA may have been motivated by good intentions ... the practical
result has been the termination of parental rights in families already experiencing the trauma of
separation due to the imprisonment of a parent."); see also Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family
Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671,
1683 (2003).
77. STEVE CHRISTIAN, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILDREN OF
INCARCERATED PARENTS 3 (2009), available at
www.ncs.org/documents/cyf/childrenofincarceratedparents.pdf; Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts:
What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 321, 348-51 (2005) (noting that average prison sentences
are longer than the twenty-two-months). See also CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 6 (2000), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty-pbdetail&iid=981 (showing that in 1997, the average incarcerated
parent was estimated to be serving 80 months).
78. LEE, supra note 1, at 7-8 ("In reviewing reported TPR cases, the significant overall increase in
the number of termination cases involving incarcerated parents that were filed from 1997 to 2002
suggests that ASFA has had an important effect."). This study also includes data from judges, attorneys,
and child welfare representatives, showing that, among other things, judges and attorneys believe that
ASFA affects children of incarcerated parents differently than other children.
79. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 105 (citing Jeremy Travis, Families & Children, 69 FED.
PROBATION 31, 34 (2005)).
188 [Vol. 24:1
Family Integrity and Incarcerated Parents
to further incentivize TPR,80 and causing family law courts to be more cursory
in their review of child welfare and termination cases. 8'
Prior to ASFA, courts treated family integrity and the best interests of the
child as congruent unless the parent was found to have committed abuse,
neglect, abandonment, or any of the other state-law-determined statutory
grounds for TPR. This framework was based on an understanding that fit
parents are generally the best protectors of their children's interests. 82 "Until
the State proves parental unfitness," cautioned the Supreme Court in Santosky,
"the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous
termination of their natural relationship."83
ASFA's 15/22 month provision, and its overall approach of prioritizing and
incentivizing adoptive placements over family reunification, has shifted the
relationship between these two concerns for children in foster care. Under
ASFA, once a child is in foster care for more than fifteen months, the default
assumption is that his or her "best interests" are in conflict with familial
reunification; and as I will show in the section that follows, if a parent is
incarcerated, practical and legal barriers often prevent him or her from
receiving the fair and individualized determination of fitness that Santosky
requires.
C. Incarceration and Parental Fitness: Barriers to an Individualized
Determination
While ASFA dictates when termination of parental rights petitions must be
initiated, state law controls how termination of parental rights is actually
carried out. Most relevantly for this Note, state law determines whether
incarceration itself can be a statutory ground for termination of parental rights,
and if not, whether incarceration makes it difficult for parents in prison to avoid
termination of their rights on other grounds. State law also determines the
scope of the procedural protections that are available to parents in TPR
proceedings, beyond the baseline mandated by the Supreme Court.
In the following section, I will first provide a brief overview of state law on
a national scale. I will then take a close look at New York State. I have chosen
New York as a case study because it may be the most progressive state on the
80. LEE, supra note 1, at I1-18 (listing changes in state law after the passage of ASFA).
81. Kennedy, supra note 17, at I l l (citing Lenore M. McWey et al., Parental Rights and the Foster
Care System: A Glimpse ofDecision Making in Virginia, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES 1031, 1027 (2008) (showing
that before the ASFA, "more family-specific evidence was presented on behalf of parents.").
82. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) ("[S]o long as a parent adequately
cares for his or her children . . . there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions ...
."); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("[H]istorically it has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.").
83. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
2012] 189
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
issue of incarcerated parents and their children, both historically and today.
New York has many organizations and community groups that advocate on
behalf of women in prison.84 Perhaps in part due to the activities of these
groups, the New York State Legislature has recently adopted some creative
approaches to making child welfare law fairer to parents in prison.85 In
addition, there is useful precedent in New York State in which advocates
challenged unfair treatment of another class of marginalized parents-victims
of domestic violence. 86 A closer look at the situation of incarcerated parents in
New York State reveals the barriers that parents nationwide are facing as they
struggle to maintain their rights, while offering various approaches to change.
State Law Overview
This section will provide a brief overview of state law implementation of
ASFA. While ASFA requires that states initiate TPR proceedings once a child
has been in foster care for 15 of the past 22 months, state law determines the
conditions under which parental rights will actually be terminated. Most states
allow TPR based on abuse, neglect, or abandonment 87 -grounds that can
interact with incarceration in a variety of ways.
In a recent article, Professor Deseriee A. Kennedy reports that the majority
of states list parental incarceration as a statutory basis for TPR, and that others
weigh conditions relating to incarceration when making a determination of
parental fitness.88 About twenty states focus on the conviction itself, permitting
the termination of parental rights when parents are incarcerated "as a result of a
particular bad act that directly affects the ability to parent safely and
effectively," such as a domestic violence or child abuse conviction." This
approach avoids categorically stigmatizing incarcerated parents and instead
focuses on the underlying crime; at the same time, it assumes that by engaging
84. Support Memos Written on Behalf of the ASFA Expanded Discretion Bill (A.5462-A/S.2233-A),
WOMEN IN PRISON PROJECT, CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK (2010), available at
www.correctionalassociation.org/WIPP/download/ASFA Bill Spt Memo List.pdf (listing sponsors of
ASFA expanded discretion bill).
85. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a)(1) (2010).
86. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
87. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 138 n. 18 (citing James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's
Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their Relationships, II WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845,
953 (2003)); Orman W. Ketcham & Richard F. Babcock, Jr., Statutory Standards for the Involuntary
Termination ofParental Rights, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 530, 531 (1975-1976).
88. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 95. For a slightly earlier but comprehensive survey of state statutes,
see LEE, supra note 1, at II (reporting that as of 2005, 36 states had TPR statutes that dealt explicitly
with incarceration, and that of these, 25 permitted rights to be terminated based on length of
incarceration. The remaining states either included a felony conviction and imprisonment as a factor in a
termination proceeding, provided for termination based on the nature of the conviction, or permitted
termination based on the qualitative effect of the parent's incarceration on the parent-child relationship).
89. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 96.
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in behaviors that adversely affect their children, parents have effectively
forfeited their rights.
In contrast to the type of statute described above, Kennedy finds that in the
majority of states either the fact of incarceration itself is a ground for TPR, or
that courts evaluate factors related to incarceration that might interfere with a
parent's ability to fulfill his or her role-for example, sentence length and the
age of the child. 90 Philip Genty has done a recent survey of the state laws that
fall into this category.91 He finds that twenty-four states currently have statutes
that provide for termination of parental rights based on incarceration itself,
most of which are framed in general terms-for example, providing for TPR
when the period of incarceration is "significant considering the child's age and
need for adult's care and supervision"92 or where the period of incarceration
would "constitute a substantial period of juvenile's life." 93 Several other
statutes link termination to a specific prison term length, for example,
providing for TPR where a parent will be in prison for more than one year,94
two years,95 or five years. 96 A few states link TPR to the child's age, such as a
Tennessee law that provides for TPR where a parent is incarcerated for ten or
more years and the child is under the age of eight.97 Kennedy points out that
because legal definitions of abuse and neglect differ among states, and because
there is disagreement about how children are affected by parental incarceration,
time frames relating to sentence length and the age of the child inevitably vary.
In some states, incarceration for two years is a sufficient ground for termination
of parental rights, while other states ask courts to determine, at their discretion,
what might constitute a "substantial" or "extended" period of time.98
State law also determines what procedural protections will be available to
parents in TPR proceedings. The Supreme Court has held that a parent's right
to appointed counsel is dependent on the complexity of the issues involved and
on the ability of an unrepresented parent to have a fair hearing. 99 Some states
have passed legislation that requires appointment of counsel in certain kinds of
child welfare proceedings. 00 In other states, courts have held that counsel
90. Id. at 98.
91. Philip Genty, Moving Beyond Generalizations and Stereotypes to Develop Individualized
Approaches for Working with Families Affected by Parental Incarceration, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 38
(2012).
92. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(o) (2011).
93. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(viii) (2011).
94. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-508(2)(e) (2011).
95. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q)(ii) (2010).
96. IOWA CODE § 232.116(1)(j)(2) (2011).
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(6) (2011).
98. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 98-99.
99. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
100. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-135(b) (2012) ("At the commencement of any proceeding
on behalf of a neglected, uncared-for, or dependent child or youth, the parent ... of the child . . . shall
have the right to counsel, and shall be so informed by the judge, that if they are unable to afford counsel,
counsel will be provide for them . . . and such counsel and such parent . . . shall have the rights of
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should be appointed only when termination of parental rights can result.'0' The
question of whether ineffective assistance of counsel guarantees apply in TPR
proceedings also varies across states.' 02
Case Study: Termination ofParental Rights in New York State
Because child welfare laws are inconsistent across states, I focus on one
state in particular-New York-in order to provide a more nuanced look into
how parents in prison may lose their parental rights. Under New York law, a
parent has permanently neglected her child when, although physically and
financially able to do so, she fails to maintain contact with or plan for the future
of her child for a period of either one year or fifteen out of the most recent
twenty-two months, even though the agency has made diligent efforts to
strengthen the parental relationship. 0 3 Once a court has found permanent
neglect, the inquiry shifts to the child's best interests: specifically, to the child's
physical and emotional well-being, including the extent to which the parent can
provide a permanent home and a normal, stable family atmosphere.' 04
New York State has been one of the most progressive regarding the rights
of incarcerated parents. While state supreme courts in Nevada and Wisconsin
have only recently found that a determination of parental unfitness cannot be
based on incarceration status alone, 05 New York came to this conclusion
through a legislative amendment in 1983. The purpose of the amendment was
to "prevent the automatic termination of parental rights of incarcerated
persons,"io6 and courts have interpreted the amendments to require particular
attention and sensitivity to the situation of parents in prison:
[I]n light of the drastic consequences of failing to plan, courts should
not set unrealistically high standards in evaluating the parent's
planning efforts and this directive undoubtedly applies with special
confrontation and cross-examination."); Fam. Ct. Act §§ 261, 262 (a)(iv) (2012) (requiring counsel in
child welfare proceedings in New York state).
101. See, e.g., In re D.F., 622 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); In re Lindsey C., 473 S.E.2d
I 10 (W. Va. 1995).
102. See, e.g., In re Oghenckevebe, 473 S.E.2d 393, 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (parent's right to
counsel includes the right to effective counsel); Arteaga v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory
Scrvs., 924 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (no guarantee of effective assistance of counsel).
103. N.Y. SOC. SERV. § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2008).
104. In re Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 314-315 (1992) (finding that in determining the "best
interests" of the child, the court should consider the fitness of the parent, the agency's plan for the child,
and the child's emotional well-being).
105. In re Max G.W., 716 N.W.2d 845, 860 (Wis. 2006) ("We . . . conclude that a parent's
incarceration does not, in itself, demonstrate that the individual is an unfit parent."); In re J.L.N., 55
P.3d 955, 959-60 (Nev. 2002) ("Incarceration alone is insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of
parental fault as it relates to failure of parental adjustment.").
106. In re Gregory B., 74 N.Y.2d 77, 88 (1989); see also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(d)
(McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2008).
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force in cases where the parent is incarcerated and thus severely
hampered in the ability to act on behalf of his or her child.107
New York has also chosen to extend additional procedural protections to
parents facing TPR. A law passed in 1975 extends the New York public
defender system to "the parent of any child seeking custody or contesting the
substantial infringement of his or her right to custody of such child." 08 Courts
have found that both the U.S. and New York constitutions protect a parent's
right to be present "throughout a proceeding implicating the termination of
parental rights," although this right may have to be balanced against the child's
right to a "prompt and permanent adjudication."' 09 If a parent is "unavoidably
absent" from the hearing, due process is only satisfied if that parent "had some
opportunity to participate in a meaningful way," whether through a phone
appearance or deposition.Ilo
Finally, New York State has recognized that family integrity and the ability
to care for one's children are fundamental liberty interests protected both under
the U.S. and New York constitutions. I Under a substantive due process
analysis, a law that infringes on a fundamental liberty interest is generally
subjected to strict scrutiny: it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
for example, found that the state's interest in protecting children must be
"subject to strict justification" when a right as central as custody is at issue.l12
Understanding family integrity as a substantive due process right is important
because it suggests that a high standard should be used when evaluating federal
and state law that terminates parental rights.
While New York State recognizes the constitutional right to family
integrity and provides strong procedural protections in some respects, the law
continues to impose barriers for parents in prison. 113 First, agencies are not
required to make the same level of effort to assist a parent in maintaining
107. Gregory B, 74 N.Y.2d at 89.
108. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 261, 262 [a][iv]. See also Fam. Ct. Act § 262 (Consol. 2001).
109. In re Casey L., 891 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (App. Div. 2009).
110. In re Eileen R, 912 N.Y.S.2d 350, 354 (App. Div. 2010).
111. People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 293-97 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) ("It is beyond dispute that the substantive due process clause protects an individual's liberty
interest in familial relations, which includes a parent's interest in the custody of his or her children."); In
re Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 382 (1979) ("In many cases the State may ... find 'better' parents for a
child even though the natural parents may be willing and able to provide proper care. But it is
fundamental to our legal and social system that it is in the best interest of a child to be raised by his
parents unless the parents are unfit.").
112. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
113. In this Note, I focus on legal barriers and their interaction with the circumstances of
incarceration. Other barriers beyond the scope of this Note include racial and class bias of family court
judges and state agency social workers; the fact that counsel, although appointed, may lack adequate
time, incentives, and monetary compensation to represent clients effectively; and procedural barriers
such as the difficulty of arranging transportation from prison to the court.
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contact and planning for the child's future when the parent is incarcerated.114
This, combined with the fact that it is already difficult for incarcerated parents
to communicate with their children, prevents many parents from defending
themselves against accusations of permanent neglect. In addition, while
incarceration in and of itself cannot be a ground for termination, New York
courts have held that a prison sentence may amount to permanent neglect when
the parent does not have the resources or family support to put the child into a
private fostering arrangement." 5
Barrier #1: Diminished Responsibility to Reunify the Family
In cases charging permanent neglect, the New York Department of Social
Services must prove as an initial matter that it made diligent efforts to
strengthen the relationship between the parent and child.1 6 There are, however,
some crucial exceptions to this requirement. First, an agency does not have to
make diligent efforts when a parent has failed for a period of six months to
keep the agency informed of her location. This can become a problem if a
child is already in foster care when a parent is sent to prison: service will be
made to the parent's last known address, and while a court may order a
"diligent search" for the absent parent, this may prove futile, particularly if the
parent's name is inconsistent in the records.' 18 Because counsel will not be
assigned unless and until the parent appears in court, a non-appearance under
these circumstances would likely be perceived as a waiver of the parent's right
to be present at the hearing." 9 Courts have interpreted the 6-months provision
against parents in a harsh manner, finding, for example, that an agency was
excused from making a diligent effort despite the fact that it could have easily
determined the parent's location in prison by questioning the child's foster
mother, who was the sister of the biological parent.120
114. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(e)(ii) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2008).
115. In re Gregory B., 74 N.Y.2d 77, 90 (1989).
116. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(f) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2008); see also In re Yvonne
N., 775 N.Y.S.2d 87 (App. Div. 2004) (The threshold inquiry in permanent neglect proceeding is
whether agency has made diligent efforts to strengthen parent-child relationship. The requirement of
demonstrating diligent efforts is not necessary, however, when an incarcerated parent has failed on more
than one occasion to cooperate with the agency in efforts to assist the parent in planning for future of the
child or in efforts to plan and arrange visits with the child).
117. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(7)(e)(i) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2008); see also In re Desire
Star H., 609 N.Y.S.2d 268 (App. Div. 1994).
118. E-mail from Philip M. Genty, Everett B. Birch Innovative Teaching Clinical Professor in
Professional Responsibility, Columbia University, to Caitlin Mitchell, JD Candidate, 2012 Law School
(Jan. 25, 2012, 6:01:58 PM EST) (on file with author).
119. Id.
120. In re Sheila G., 61 N.Y.2d 368 (1984); see also In re Sasha R., 675 N.Y.S.2d 605 (App. Div.
1998) (agency excused from making diligent efforts when father failed to keep the agency apprised of
his prison address and could not be located because he had used different surnames in his dealings with
the agency).
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In addition to the six-months exception, there is a second exception that
applies specifically to incarcerated parents: an agency does not have to make
diligent efforts to reunify the family when "[a]n incarcerated parent has failed
on more than one occasion while incarcerated to cooperate with an authorized
agency in its efforts to assist such parent to plan for the future of the child."l21
Under this provision, a few instances of conflict or miscommunication legally
excuse the agency from its obligations.
Even when neither of these exceptions to the diligent efforts requirement
applies, New York courts have often required less effort from agencies when
parents are in prison. As bluntly expressed by the Family Court of New York,
Kings County in 2010, "diligent efforts in the context of incarcerated parents
are different from the efforts required for parents at liberty." 22 To meet their
burden, agencies must make arrangements for counseling, visitation, and advice
relating to the "child's progress and development"123-requirements that are
lower than they would be for non-incarcerated parents. In In re Love Russell J,
the Appellate Court for the Second Department found that an agency had
exercised diligent efforts by "facilitating visitation, keeping [the father]
apprised of the children's welfare, and repeatedly reminding him of the need to
find a resource for the care of his children."1 24 The agency "apprised" the
father that his sisters "were not viable resources" and "warned" him of the
consequences of his failure to plan. The father, notes the court, "did not suggest
any other potential resources."1 25 Here, it appears that the agency simply
informed the father of his responsibilities, while doing nothing to help him
figure out how to fulfill them. 126
121. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(c)(ii) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2008); see, e.g., In re Eric
L., 11, 857 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (App. Div. 2008) ("Here, the father indicated by letter to petitioner's
caseworker that he had some relatives, including his brother, with whom the child could be placed while
he was incarcerated. When the caseworker asked the father to provide her with contact information for
those relatives, the father never replied. We thus conclude that petitioner was relieved of its obligation to
exercise diligent efforts while the father was incarcerated, based on the father's failure to cooperate with
petitioner during that period of time.").
122. In re Commitment of Alicia G., 908 N.Y.S.2d 810, 815 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2010) ("[W]hereas
diligent efforts generally require provision of services and other assistance to the parents, so that
problems preventing discharge of the child from care may be resolved or ameliorated, there is an
exception for incarcerated parent.").
123. In re Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 142 (1984) ("Those efforts must include counseling,
making suitable arrangements for visitation, providing assistance to the parents to resolve or ameliorate
the problems . . . and advising the parent at appropriate intervals of the child's progress and
development.").
124. In re Love Russell J., 776 N.Y.S.2d 859, 859-860 (App. Div. 2004).
125. Love, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
126. See also In re Gregory B., 74 N.Y.2d 77, 87 (1989) (observing that the agency satisfied the
diligent efforts requirement when it "arranged for visitation between respondent and his child,
communicated with respondent and kept him apprised of his child's progress, and assisted respondent in
formulating a plan for his child's future").
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Barrier #2: Obstacles to Maintaining Contact and Planning for the Future
Once an agency has demonstrated that it fulfilled its obligation to make
diligent efforts to strengthen the child-parent relationship, it must prove that the
parent's actions constituted permanent neglect-that the parent failed to
maintain contact with or to plan for the future of her child.127 New York courts
have taken a rather strict view of these provisions as they apply to incarcerated
parents, emphasizing that incarcerated parents are expected to take
responsibility for themselves and their children and to comply with the same
time limits and requirements as non-incarcerated parents. 128 This is true despite
the fact that most correctional facilities, particularly those for women, are
located in remote, rural areas, posing a major logistical and financial barrier to
visitation.129 More than half of mothers never receive visits from their children
during the time they are incarcerated. 130
Despite the difficulties that even loving, committed parents may have,
courts routinely terminate the rights of parents in prison who fail to maintain
regular and high-quality contact with their children.'31 In determining whether
"contact" was sustained, New York courts evaluate the quality of the
interactions between parents and children, finding, for example, that visitation
alone is insufficient where the "quality of the visitation was poor." 32 Thus,
while New York law states that parental rights should only be terminated if the
parent fails to maintain contact with her child although physically and
financially able to do so, courts are often unsympathetic to the various barriers
that incarcerated parents face and generally require the parent to show that it
was effectively impossible for her to communicate with her child and the state
agency.133
127. N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinncy 2003 & Supp. 2008).
128. In re Delores B., 533 N.Y.S.2d 706 (App. Div. 1988) (parent's incarceration does not in itself
render him physically or financially unable to maintain contact with or plan for future of children, and
incarcerated parent's obligation to child is same as that of any other parent).
129. See JULIE KowITZ MARGOLIES & TAMAR KRAFT-STOLAR, WOMEN IN PRISON PROJECT,
CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y. STATE, WHEN "FREE" MEANS LOSING YOUR MOTHER: THE COLLISION OF CHILD
WELFARE AND THE INCARCERATION OF WOMEN IN NEW YORK STATE 11 (2006).
130. BARBARA BLOOM, BARBARA OWEN, & STEPHANIE COVINGTON, NAT'L INST. OF CORR.,
GENDER RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WOMEN
OFFENDERS 7 (2003); Glaze, supra note 7 (noting that only 53% of parents in state prison had spoken
with their children over the telephone, and only 42% had a personal visit, since admission).
131. See, e.g., In re Shannon "QQ.", 690 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (App. Div. 1999) (finding that
"incarceration alone does not excuse respondent's failure to contact his child" where parent did not
attempt to contact Social Services to ascertain location of daughter); In re Antia Siami D., 596 N.Y.S.2d
64 (App. Div. 1993) (terminating incarcerated parent's rights because parent had failed to contact
children for more than six months); In re Ravon Paul H., 161 A.D.2d 257, 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
("Sporadic and minimal attempts to maintain a parental relationship are insufficient to prevent a finding
of abandonment.").
132. In re Tasha Monica B., 156 A.D.2d 247, 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
133. See, e.g., In re Trudell J.W., 119 A.D.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (termination of
parental rights appropriate where mother did not produce evidence that her failure to contact child or
agency was result of circumstances that made it impossible for her to do so).
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The requirement that parents "plan for the future" of their children is
similarly demanding. Plans must be "reasonable" and "achievable," and New
York's highest court has held that an adequate plan for a child's future must
solve the personal problems that led to the child's initial removal-for example
requiring employment, suitable housing, and psychological counseling.1 34 This
level of planning, resources, and projected stability would be difficult for many
parents of foster care children to achieve, let alone parents in prison.
Barrier #3: Prison Sentence as Permanent Neglect
The requirement that parents plan for the future of their children poses a
particular barrier for parents serving sentences that are longer than a few years.
In In re Gregory B., the New York Court of Appeals first held that a parent
whose only option was to leave his children in foster care for the duration of his
sentence should lose his rights, because leaving a child in foster care, even with
visitation and other contact, was insufficient to fulfill the obligation to plan.
The court noted that even though there was a legislative concern for the rights
of incarcerated parents, a child deserves "normal family life in a permanent
home" with a nurturing family relationship, and Gregory B's father could not
provide this.136
Other courts have extended this reasoning to justify TPR based on
sentences that are much shorter. For example, courts have found that parental
plans to leave children in foster care for seven years,137 six years,13 three
years, 139 and two years140 were inappropriate. In some TPR cases, courts failed
to indicate the length of the sentence, stating only that an incarcerated parent's
reliance on the foster care system constituted a failure to plan.141
Under Gregory and subsequent case law, a parent's sentence, combined
with a lack of family members or resources, has come to constitute ipso facto
134. In re Leon R.R., 48 N.Y.2d 117, 125-26 (1979).
135. In re Gregory B., 74 N.Y.2d 77, 90 (1989) ("[A]n incarcerated parent may not satisfy the
planning and requirement of the statute where the only plan offered is long-term foster care lasting
potentiallyfor the child's entire minority.").
136. Gregory B., 74 N.Y.2d at 89-90.
137. See In re Omar Garry G, 603 N.Y.S.2d 860, 860 (App. Div. 1993).
138. In re Guardianship and Custody of Latasha C., 602 N.Y.S.2d II (App. Div. 1993).
139. In re Carmen N., 655 N.Y.S.2d 651 (App. Div. 1997) (incarcerated father permanently
neglected daughter, and thus his parental rights could be terminated, by failing to provide any realistic
and feasible alternative to having daughter remain in foster care until his earliest possible release on
parole in three years).
140. In re C. Children, 677 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (App. Div. 1998) ("Although the father made efforts
to maintain contact with his children, the record reveals that he failed to plan for their future as he was
unable to provide any 'realistic and feasible' alternative to having them remain in foster care until his
earliest release from prison, some two years later. . . ").
141. See, e.g., In re Samantha K., 872 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (App. Div. 2009) ("Even where an
incarcerated parent makes an effort to develop a feasible plan for the future of his or her child, a finding
of permanent neglect is appropriate where, as here, no alternative to foster care for the duration of the
parent's incarceration is provided. . . .").
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parental unfitness. The Gregory court specifically approved a finding of
permanent neglect "where an incarcerated father has maintained contact with
his children but simply does not have the family resources to provide a realistic
alternative to foster care during the period of his incarceration." 42 The idea
that imprisonment combined with lack of resources can constitute a showing of
permanent neglect seems to be a more lenient version of the law that pre-dated
the 1983 amendment, which allowed courts to terminate parental rights based
on the fact of incarceration alone.
III: BRIDGING THE DIVIDE
In the final section of this Note, I consider strategies for bringing the laws
that affect parents in prison into alignment with the long-established
constitutional values of family integrity and the right to care for one's children.
I begin my analysis with Nicholson v. Williams, a recent lawsuit in which
survivors of domestic violence whose children were taken into custody by New
York's Administration for Child Services (ACS) challenged this state practice
as a violation of their constitutional rights.143 By arguing that the state's
policies failed to protect children, the plaintiffs were able to re-frame
aggressive state intervention that had previously been seen as reasonable,
revealing it instead to be based on constitutionally impermissible bias and
bureaucratic convenience. In effect, the plaintiffs shifted the framework from
the social welfare paradigm of family law to a family law paradigm centered on
parental rights and family integrity.
The Nicholson strategy would be more difficult to use in the context of
incarcerated parents; in fact, the Nicholson court defined its sympathetic,
victimized plaintiff class against the named plaintiff in Lassiter, an incarcerated
mother convicted of murder who was contesting the termination of her parental
rights.144 Yet the arguments made against ACS policy in Nicholson do in fact
ring true in the context of parents in prison: the law as it stands not only
compromises the family integrity and parental rights of incarcerated parents,
but fails to further the best interests of their children. This is because current
law sometimes results in parental rights being terminated erroneously, and
because even when the law is correctly applied, it can reflect an inaccurate
understanding of what the best interests of children truly are.
In the final part of this section, I argue that the Nicholson strategy need not
be limited to litigation. The argument that the laws that undermine the rights of
incarcerated parents actually contradict the best interests of their children is a
powerful approach that can be used to advocate for legislative and policy
142. In re Gregory B., 74 N.Y.2d 77, 88 (1989).
143. 203 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
144. Id. at 254.
198 [Vol. 24:1
Family Integrity and Incarcerated Parents
reforms. In particular, I discuss a recent amendment to New York state law: the
Adoption and Safe Families Expanded Discretion Act.145
A. Nicholson v. Williams: Using Litigation to Expose Family Law
Bifurcation
In Nicholson v. Williams, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York issued a preliminary injunction against the Agency for Children's
Services (ACS), finding that ACS had violated the constitutional rights of the
plaintiff class-a group of women who had temporarily lost custody of their
children on the basis of being physically abused by their partners.146 This case
illustrates how an argument based on the right to family integrity can be
successfully used to challenge abusive state practices towards a particularly
vulnerable class of parents. The crucial argument in Nicholson is not that
parental rights have been violated, however-rather, it is that agency practices
that remove children from their homes for inappropriate reasons undermine the
welfare of children. It is only by using this argument that parental rights and
family integrity become compelling to the court.
The plaintiffs in Nicholson v. Williams challenged ACS's policy of taking
the children of abused mothers into emergency custody. ACS failed to conduct
any kind of investigation: it did not determine whether alternatives short of
removal might exist, whether a mother was taking steps to protect her children
or to address the problems in the home, or whether there were even objective
indications that children were in danger.147 Instead, ACS "automatically [held]
both the abuser and the abusee liable as a unit and relie[d] on unfounded
presumptions about the negative character and abilities of battered women." 48
The court found that the practices of ACS interfered with the mothers' liberty
interest in familial integrity, both on procedural and substantive due process
grounds.' 49 Under New York law, ACS must show that there is "imminent"
danger to a child, and an "objectively reasonable basis" for determining this
danger, before it can remove a child from her home without judicial
authorization.150 By making blanket assumptions of danger based on domestic
abuse, ACS both misinterpreted both the New York statute and violated the
145. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney 203 & Supp. 2008).
146. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (finding that removals conducted by ACS in relation to
abused mothers constituted clear and convincing evidence of repeated misconduct, constituting a policy
and practice for the purposes of a section 1983 analysis.).
147. Id. at 250 ("ACS did not conduct sufficient investigation before removing children ... fail[ed]
to determine what [could be] done . .. without forced removal ..... [and] fails to adequately investigate
what the mother has done to try to protect herself and her children.").
148. Id.
149. Id. at 235 ("Plaintiffs have established that ACS has consistently violated this right of family
integrity.").
150. Id. at 237.
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more general procedural protections mandated by Stanley v. Illinois, which
require that "states provide individual hearings to ascertain unfitness instead of
relying on presumptions about categories of people."',51 The state can neither
deny a hearing to a class of people, as it did in Stanley, nor can it infringe on a
person's familial rights solely because they belong to a particular class or
category of person.1 52
The Nicholson Court found that ACS and the New York Family Courts
were implicated in a second set of procedural due process violations. Although
indigent parents in New York state have a right to counsel in custody and
termination of parental rights proceedings, numerous factors had converged to
undermine this right, including low monetary compensation and nearly
impossible work conditions for attorneys, resulting in inadequate preparation
and long delays. 153 The court found that overburdened New York Family Court
judges thus relied heavily on ACS to provide them with information and
analysis of the situation, allowing the agency "expansive latitude."1 54 The "net
effect," stated the court, "is that where the health and safety of children are
involved, a parent accused of neglect or abuse is guilty until proven
innocent." 155
Finally, the court found that ACS had violated the substantive due process
rights of the plaintiff class by infringing on their fundamental rights in the
absence of a compelling governmental interest. The court applied the three-part
Joyner test for evaluating a substantive due process claim: under Joyner, 156a
state law or policy is unconstitutional if it "significantly infringe[s]" on a
"fundamental right" without being justified by "an important state interest.",157
The court found that taking children into custody against the will of their
mothers constituted a "substantial" infringement of fundamental familial
151. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972).
152. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 240 ("Whether a presumption be deemed procedural or
substantive ... the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a state can rely on a presumption that a class
of people are unfit") (citation omitted). 153. Id. at 255 ("The evidence overwhelmingly
demonstrates that 18-B appointed counsel are not effective. . . .These problems are a direct result of the
fact that 18-B lawyers are compensated at a level at which they cannot afford the essential
accoutrements of basic professional service . . . [are] prevented from maintaining a separate private
practice to supplement this inadequate compensation, and [are] required to take on unmanageable
caseloads.. . .").
153. Id. at 255 ("The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that 18-B appointed counsel are not
effective. ... These problems are a direct result of the fact that 18-B lawyers are compensated at a level
at which they cannot afford the essential accoutrements of basic professional service . . . [are] prevented
from maintaining a separate private practice to supplement this inadequate compensation, and [are]
required to take on unmanageable caseloads .... .").
154. Id. at 222 ("Because of their heavy caseloads, [they] cannot immediately devote much time to
each case . . . . Facing this quandary, judges allow ACS expansive latitude because they assume ACS
has much better information. . .
155. Id.
156. Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983).
157. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
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rights. 158 It then found that the practice, due to its over-breadth, undermined the
best interests of children because it resulted in some children being placed
unnecessarily into state care, causing trauma and disruption in their lives.159
Because the agency policies "work[ed] against the state interest in protecting
the safety of children, not for it," they violated the substantive due process
rights of the plaintiffs, no matter what level of scrutiny was applied.160
After establishing that ACS practices did not serve the best interests of
children, the court considered what interests these practices might be serving
instead. The abused mothers, reasoned the court, were improperly prosecuted
"under what might at best be termed false assumptions and findings"-bias that
an abused mother is not a fit parent. 1 Thus, far from being fundamental or
compelling, "[t]he government's interests are particularly weak; its actions are
motivated by bureaucratic pusillanimity and ignorance that harm rather than
help the interests of the child." 62
While it provides an example of how a successful lawsuit on behalf of a
vulnerable parent-class might be framed, Nicholson also reveals some of the
inherent difficulties in applying this approach to the context of incarcerated
parents. Parents of children who are in foster care have already been
adjudicated as unable to care for their children, at least temporarily. In the case
of parents in prison, that inability to provide care is often considered to be a
parent's own fault, the result of a crime for which they have been convicted.
The Nicholson Court explicitly distinguished the Nicholson plaintiffs from
the plaintiff in Lassiter, the sole Supreme Court case involving the termination
of parental rights of an incarcerated person.' 63  The Nicholson Court
characterized Lassiter herself as ". . . an incarcerated murderer who had left her
son languishing in foster care for over two years without trying to contact him .
. .164 The Nicholson plaintiffs, by contrast, were portrayed as sympathetic
victims of violence who were "deeply concerned with caring for their children.
. . [and had] a good chance of maintaining uninterrupted custody or of
reacquiring their children sooner if represented by effective counsel." 65 The
New York court ignored the three dissenting Supreme Court justices in
Lassiter, who argued that the plaintiff had failed to maintain contact with her
158. Id.at251.
159. See id. at 253 (holding that such actions not only "fail to advance the best interests of children
... [but actually] harm children").
160. See id. at 266 ("ACS policies and practice result in routine removals that are unnecessary and
ignore alternatives that would be far better for the children involved. These policies and practices cannot
be justified by recourse to any state interest in the child's welfare.").
161. Id.at252.
162. Id. at 255.
163. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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son only because the state agency made little effort to facilitate visits and had
refused to place the child with Lassiter's mother.' 6 6
Ultimately, although the Nicholson court was sympathetic to the survivors
of domestic violence whose children had been summarily taken into state
custody, the case illustrates the way in which a parent's rights can dissolve
when they are placed in tension with the state's interest in protecting children.
As described above, the Nicholson Court found that policies involving the
removal of children from their homes demanded a strict scrutiny analysis; yet it
also suggested that the strict scrutiny standard might be relaxed in light of the
"particularly compelling state interest to protect and promote child welfare."l 67
Paradoxically, the court seemed to imply that strict scrutiny is appropriate only
in cases where there is no tension between parental rights and state interests at
all. 168
Based on the example of Nicholson, the success of any challenge to the
laws and policies that detrimentally affect parents in prison would be
contingent upon the ability of plaintiffs and their advocates to demonstrate that
these practices, like the ones described in Nicholson, undermine the welfare of
children-that premature or erroneous termination decisions based on bias,
convenience, or lack of understanding of incarcerated parents and their children
are never in a child's best interests.
B. Applying Nicholson: The Best Interests of the Child
I believe that a Nicholson-like argument could be made on behalf of
parents in prison, despite the specter of Lassiter. Like the Nicholson plaintiffs,
incarcerated parents experience violations of family integrity that undermine
the best interests of their children. There is broad consensus that the erroneous
termination of parental rights is harmful to children.169 Under the current legal
regime, an incarcerated parent who does in fact have a strong bond with her
child, and who may be able to resume caring for the child in the relatively near
future, may nonetheless lose her rights because of ACS's determination that
"reasonable efforts" to unify the family can be waived. The waiver effectively
destroys the ability of a parent to defend herself, because the physical and
166. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 52-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 245.
168. Id. ("[I]n the context of familial rights, if a government's intruding policies can be
demonstrated not to advance child welfare then any infringement at all of the mother-child substantive
due process right would trigger strict scrutiny.") (emphasis added).
169. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) ("[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness,
the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural
relationship."); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 47-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The State may, and does,
properly assert a legitimate interest in promoting the physical and emotional well-being of its minor
children. But this interest is not served by terminating the rights of any concerned, responsible parent.");
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653 (1972) ("the State spites its own articulated goals when it
needlessly separates" the parents from the child).
[Vol. 24:1202
Family Integrity and Incarcerated Parents
financial reality of incarceration makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a
parent to maintain contact with and plan for her child's future without extensive
assistance. In this type of case, current practices may lead courts to make
erroneous determinations of parental fitness, to the detriment of all involved.
If empirically supported, policies and practices that lead to erroneous
terminations of parental rights are easy targets for Nicholson-like litigation.
Whether or not a TPR is decided in error, however, is often far from clear-cut.
TPR determinations are necessarily complex, highly individualized
determinations based on the balancing of numerous factors. In the end, judges
retain broad discretion over the interpretation of standards such as the "best
interest of the child," or whether a parent has made the threshold effort required
to plan for her child's future.
Erroneous determinations of parental unfitness are not the only problem,
however; more fundamentally, I would argue that the current legal regime is
harmful to children because it reflects an inaccurate understanding of what the
best interests of children with incarcerated parents actually are. This argument
parallels the substantive due process claims in Nicholson: that ACS wrongly
removed children from their homes based on bias, an inaccurate understanding
of the dynamics of domestic violence, and bureaucratic convenience. This
raises the decades-old, empirically-evasive question of what children with
incarcerated parents need: when and how can an incarcerated parent play a
meaningful role in a child's life? Are a child's interests served by fully severing
ties with the troubled parent so that s/he can form a fuller, more complete bond
with an adoptive parent, or is there some kind of middle ground? Is adoption
even a realistic option? While a comprehensive investigation of best practices
in relation to children with incarcerated parents is beyond the scope of this
Note, recent studies indicate that parents in prison can play a meaningful and
beneficial role in their children's lives.
Scholars have also argued that ASFA and other laws that incentivize
termination of parental rights do not necessarily support the best interests of
children because parental rights may be terminated without there being a family
that wishes to adopt.170 Thus, while Congress's intent in passing ASFA may
have been to further the goal of achieving permanency for children, ASFA has
in fact created a class of "legal orphans," children whose biological parents
have lost their rights but who continue to live in the foster care system. Studies
indicate that while the net number of adoptions has increased under ASFA, the
number of children who are available to be adopted has also increased: for
example, less than one percent of children in foster care from 1996-2000 were
170. See ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 157; Garrison, supra note 54, at 425; LaShanda Taylor,
Resurrecting Parents of Legal Orphans: Un-Terminating Parental Rights, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 2,
318,325 (2010).
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adopted, while the foster care population increased at an average of four
percent per year.17
Other laws, such as New York's waiver of the reasonable efforts
requirement when a parent is incarcerated, underestimate the degree to which
children can maintain relationships with their incarcerated parents-
particularly with proper institutional support. In a number of recent articles and
studies, scholars have argued that children are able to maintain meaningful and
supportive relationships with their incarcerated parents, 172 and that facilitating
contact and communication between children and parents is highly beneficial to
both.173 These studies have been used to advocate for structural changes in
prisons themselves that would allow parents and children to see each other
more often and to have higher-quality experiences: for example, making it
easier for incarcerated parents to visit with their children; 174 parenting
classes;175 and nurseries, which would allow mothers to care for their infants
and establish the crucial parent-child bond.176 Laws such as the exception to
the diligent efforts requirement seem to be based on the idea that parents in
prison will benefit less from, or are inherently less deserving of, agency
support. Yet it is precisely in the context of parental incarceration that "diligent
efforts" on the part of the agency are most important, since parents in prison are
unable to maintain contact with and plan for their children's future without
agency support in transportation and other logistics.
In addition to this waiver of the diligent efforts requirement, I would also
argue that laws that allow courts to equate sentence length with permanent
neglect do not necessarily serve the state's interest in protecting children. Even
assuming that Gregory B. was correctly decided, it is possible to imagine
scenarios where a lengthy sentence should not be categorically equated with
neglect. For example, what if the child at issue is a teenager who has a strong
relationship with his parent, was benefiting from visits and communication, has
171. Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales from the Age ofASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV.
129, 135-45 (2001).
172. Erika London Bocknek, Jessica Sanderson, & Preston A. Britner, Ambiguous Loss and
Posttraumatic Stress in School-Age Children of Prisoners, 18 J. CHILD & FAM. STUDS. 323, 330 (2009)
(arguing that children continue to value their relationship with their parent and that children perceive
their incarcerated parent to be an important person in their social network); Wm. Justin Dyer, Prison,
Fathers, and Identity: A Theory of How Incarceration Affects Men's Paternal Identity, 3 FATHERING
201, 202 (2005) (discussing how incarceration has a negative effect on family relationships); Genty,
supra note 76, at 1683-84 (demonstrating that the importance of maintaining family relationships while
parents are incarcerated is well-documented in numerous articles and studies); Kennedy, supra note 17,
at 83 ("[R]esearch demonstrates that incarcerated parents can, with assistance, be effective parents and
are not, by definition, bad or neglectful parents.")
173. Boudin, supra note 6 at 83 ("The fact that parent-child visitation can help children overcome
the challenges of parental separation and reduce recidivism rates is well-documented."); Kennedy, supra
note 17, at 94.
174. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 130-31.
175. Id. at 135.
176. REBECCA PROJECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., MOTHERS BEHIND
BARS 30 (2010), http://www.rebeccaproject.org/images/storics/files/mothersbehindbarsreport-2010.pdf.
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no wish to identify another adult as his "parent," and has no real prospect of
being adopted?177 Finally, even beyond best interests arguments, some scholars
and courts have suggested that children themselves have a right to a
relationship with their parents.178
An advocate wishing to challenge current child welfare policy on the
grounds that it undermines the constitutional rights of parents in prison could
find a powerful strategy in the Nicholson litigation. As in Nicholson, the key
element to prove would be that the law in question-whether New York's
exception to the diligent efforts requirement, or ASFA itself-harms children
rather than protects them. This harm could occur on a number of levels:
because inadequate safeguards result in erroneous terminations; because over-
incentivizing TPR is in fact leading to an increase in "legal orphans" rather
than permanency for foster children; or because current law reflects an
inaccurate picture of the children of incarcerated parents and their needs.
Once a law is disconnected from the compelling governmental interest in
protecting children, the infringement of parental rights and familial protections
becomes unjustifiable. Like ACS's practice of summarily assuming custody of
children in the domestic violence context, the law at issue is revealed to be
overbroad, allowing for state intervention without enough attention to
individual circumstances and needs, based on the "particularly weak"
motivations of "bureaucratic pusillanimity and ignorance"-motivations "that
harm rather than help the interests of the child."' 79
The Nicholson strategy-advocating for the rights of incarcerated parents
by arguing that the laws that compromise family integrity are harmful to
children-can also be used to support forms of advocacy beyond litigation. In
the section that follows, I examine one of these alternative approaches:
legislative reform, in the form of New York State's Adoption and Safe Families
Act Expanded Discretion Bill. Other approaches to reform that are beyond the
scope of this Note include bringing questions of children's best interests into
the sentencing process; 180 an expansion of programs that provide alternatives to
incarceration that would allow parents and young children to remain
together; 181 and challenging the dichotomy between family reunification on the
177. Ideally, these kinds of considerations should be brought up in the dispositional phase of a TPR
hearing. However, given that the outcome of the dispositional phase is based on a lower standard of
proof and depends in such great part on the subjective view of the judge, I would argue that both the
parent's rights and the child's interests would be best protected by strictly adhering to Santosky's
requirement that each and every parent receive an individualized hearing.
178. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp.2d 153, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The interest in
not being forcibly separated by the state is shared by parents and children."); Boudin, supra note 6, at
104-12.
179. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
180. Boudin, supra note 6, at 91-98.
181. LEE, supra note 1, at 9 ("The field should pay particular attention to the need for family-based
and community-based substance abuse treatment programs, the lack of which appears to influence the
frequency of TPR in cases involving incarcerated parents and their children."); REBECCA PROJECT,
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one hand and complete termination of parental rights on the other, by allowing
children to visit and communicate with non-custodial biological parents.182
C. The ASFA Expanded Discretion Bill
While perhaps not as visionary and dramatic as the Nicholson litigation, the
ASFA Expanded Discretion Billl 83 is a concrete effort on the part of the New
York State Legislature to specifically address some of the barriers that parents
in prison currently face. The Bill gives courts and agencies greater
discretionary latitude to exempt incarcerated parents from particular
requirements at three different points in the termination process. First, the
amendments address the ASFA requirement that states initiate TPR when a
child has been in foster care for fifteen of the past twenty two months, requiring
agencies to assess whether an incarcerated parent "maintains a meaningful role
in the child's life" before deciding to file.184 More specifically, agencies are to
consider overt acts manifesting concern for the child, such as letters, phone
calls, and visits; efforts by the parent to work with the agency and other service
providers; a "positive response by the parent to the agency's diligent efforts;"
and "whether the parent's continued involvement is in the child's best
interests." 8 The agency must consider the opinions of those familiar with the
parent and the child, including the parent and the child themselves, as well as
the parent's attorney. Secondly, the amendments address the provision of New
York law that creates an exception to the "diligent efforts" requirement when a
parent has been out of contact with the agency for six months, allowing courts
to "consider the particular delays or barriers an incarcerated parent . . . may
experience in keeping the agency apprised of his or her location."' 86 Finally,
the amendments require that a court deciding allegations of permanent neglect
"consider the special circumstances of an incarcerated parent" more generally,
noting that these parents may have trouble maintaining contact with their
children and may lack access to social and rehabilitative services. 187 The 2010
supra note 176, at 36 (showing that thirty-four states already make alternative programs of some kind
available to women, although they may have limited capacity. Prison nurseries, while much inferior to
family-based alternative sentencing, also offer some opportunity for mother-child bonding and are
available in thirteen states. Seventeen states do not offer family-based treatment programs of any kind).
182. Garrison, supra note 54, at 425.
183. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney 203 & Supp. 2008).
184. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(L)(i) (McKinney 203 & Supp. 2008) (stating that a state
agency should not file a petition to terminate parental rights when "the parent or parents are
incarcerated, or participating in a residential substance abuse treatment program, or the prior
incarceration or participation of a parent or parents in a residential substance abuse treatment program is
a significant factor in why the child has been in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months,
provided that the parent maintains a meaningful role in the child's life.").
185. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(1)(v) (McKinney 203 & Supp. 2008).
186. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(e)(i) (McKinney 203 & Supp. 2008).
187. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a)(McKinney 203 & Supp. 2008) (stating that "special
circumstances" include, but are not limited to, "limitations placed on family contact and the
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amendments push courts and agencies to take seriously the principle,
established in earlier New York case law, that "in light of the drastic
consequences . . . courts should not set unrealistically high standards . . .
[especially] in cases where the parent is incarcerated and thus severely
hampered in the ability to act on behalf of his or her child."188
The ASFA Expanded Discretion Bill does not fully remove the barriers
that parents in prison face as they attempt to maintain their rights: the
amendments call the attention of judges and agency workers to the specific
situation of incarcerated parents, but ultimately, courts and agencies may
choose whether or not they want to utilize this "expanded discretion." I would
argue, however, that the ASFA Expanded Discretion Bill brings termination
proceedings in New York State closer to constitutional values of family
integrity. First, by asking judges to consider various factors relating to the
particular situation of parents in prison, the new law pushes courts to fulfill
their obligation to provide an individualized hearing in which each family will
be fully evaluated. At the same time, the new law educates judges about the
barriers that incarcerated parents face and suggests that some amount of leeway
or consideration should be granted. The amendment may also help to protect
incarcerated parents from ASFA's 15/22 month requirement by requiring state
agencies to look at the particular child-parent relationship involved, rather than
initiating TPR petitions based strictly on a time-based deadline.
While it is too early to know what the full effects will be, family courts
have taken notice of the amendments. For example, in In re Alicia G, the
Family Court of New York, King's County refused to terminate the parental
rights of an incarcerated mother.189 Invoking the recent amendments, the court
took a hard look at the agency's claims at diligent efforts and the mother's
attempts to comply. Among other things, it found that while Alicia's mother
had rejected counseling services at the prison-an action that the agency
argued constituted a failure to plan-the agency had never shown that the
mother actually needed counseling in the first place. While the agency argued
that the services were recommended by the prison authorities, the court found
that this was not enough; the agency needed to demonstrate that the prison's
evaluation of the parent's needs were correct, or at least "reasonable."' 90 This
kind of nuanced, detailed, assessment of the interactions between the parent
and the agency demonstrates respect for the rights of the parent and a
willingness on the part of the Family Court to actually make an individualized
determination of fitness.
unavailability of social or rehabilitative services to aid in the development of a meaningful relationship
between the parent and his or her child, that may impact the parent's ability to . . . maintain contact with
* . and to plan for the future of his or her child").
188. Gregory B., 74 N.Y.2d 77, 89.
189. In re Commitment of Alicia G., 908 N.Y.S.2d 810, 816-17 (Fam. Ct. 2010).
190. Id. at 817.
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CONCLUSION
In this Note, I have attempted to shed light on the process by which a
person may permanently lose her parental rights while serving a prison
sentence. It would seem that the constitutional right to familial integrity could
be used to challenge the laws that lead to this injustice. I argue, however, that
there is a deep divide between parents who are considered deserving of
constitutionally-based familial rights, and those for whom aggressive state
intervention and weakened safeguards are considered appropriate.
As is evidenced in Nicholson v. Williams, the injustice of the family law
divide can be exposed when state practices that violate family integrity are
shown to undermine the welfare of children. Even within the framework of
ASFA and other laws that emphasize permanency over reunification, the
unnecessary severing of parent-child bonds is understood to be harmful to
children as well as to their parents. In some situations, children will be freed for
adoption because incarcerated parents receive inadequate agency support, and
because the physical and financial conditions of prison life make
communication and planning extremely difficult. Some of these children will
not be adopted by other families. These outcomes violate parental rights
without furthering the compelling state interest in promoting the welfare of
children.
While Nicholson provides an important model for challenging policies that
are over-broad and facilitate erroneous determinations, there are some
situations in which family integrity and children's best interests do conflict. For
example, a policy that allows courts to equate "lengthy sentences" with
permanent neglect seems to undermine the interests of children when "lengthy"
can mean a prison term as brief as two years and the parent and child are
strongly bonded. Yet under some circumstances, parents' and children's
interests will in fact diverge-what if a parent is serving a ten-year sentence
and foster care is the only option for her very young child? Perhaps it is
appropriate to distinguish between laws that are truly in the best interests of
children and those that are not, even if this means that parental rights will
sometimes be compromised. Our society has determined that state intervention
is necessary when parents are unable to care for their children; at some point,
after due process has been accorded, there is in fact a state interest in protecting
children that must trump the rights of their parents.
The troubling reality, however, is that this point often falls where resources
end, and thus along lines of race and class. It is parents without economic
resources who must resort to placing their children in the non-kinship foster
care arrangements that trigger ASFA in the first place. The problem becomes
vaster when we consider the astounding number of people who are incarcerated
in the United States; the fact that communities of color are disproportionately
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affected; and that a parent can, under mandatory minimum sentencing laws or
other harsh policies, receive a significant prison term for a minor drug offense,
shop-lifting, or parole violation.191
Groups that advocate on behalf of women in prison have shown that most
women who are incarcerated suffer from some combination of drug addiction,
mental illness, and past physical or sexual trauma, and that for many of these
women, incarceration comes as a result of unaffordable treatment and lack of
support services.192 Perhaps a law that characterizes a lengthy prison sentence
as permanent neglect furthers the state interest in protecting children; at the
same time, it is deeply unjust that a parent could lose her rights because she
shop-lifted or sold drugs and does not have the familial or economic resources
to take her children out of non-kinship foster care.
To vindicate the rights of parents in prison, it is not enough to challenge
particular policies that lead to erroneous TPR determinations. We need to
advocate for a broader understanding of the best interests of children, whether
through litigation, legislation, or other methods.193 We must conduct more
extensive research that demonstrates not only that ASFA has caused a major
increase in TPR for incarcerated parents, but that in some significant portion of
cases, TPR has resulted in poor outcomes for the children involved. Yet the
best interests of children will only be fully realized when families and
communities are supported, rather than incarcerated-when parents have
access to the resources they need to be functional both in their own lives and as
caregivers for their children.
191. Women are increasingly being arrested for drug crimes. See NATASHA A. FROST, JUDITH
GREEN, & KEVIN PRANIS, WOMEN'S PRISON ASS'N, HARD HIT: THE GROWTH IN THE IMPRISONMENT OF
WOMEN, 1977-2004, at 25 (2006), available at
www.wpaonline.org/institute/hardhit/HardHitReport4.pdf ("Between 1995 and 2004, arrests of women
for drug offenses rose by 48 percent compared to 23 percent growth for men.").
192. See REBECCA PROJECT, supra note 176, at 23-25; Kennedy, supra note 17, at 89 (arguing that
mothers "are less likely to have committed a violent crime than either male prisoners or non-mothers").
193. ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 268 ("ingredients for a strong child welfare program are clear and
simple: first, reduce family poverty by increasing the minimum wage, instituting guaranteed income,
and enacting aggressive job creation policies; second, establish . .. national health insurance; third,
provide high-quality subsidized child care. . . [and] affordable housing").
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